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Abstract
This study examines the impact of state health insurance regulations on the price of highdeductible family and individual polices in the nongroup market. We use a unique and rich data
set on actual insurance policies sold through a large Internet health insurance distributor to examine the impact of various regulations on policy prices, controlling for policy characteristics,
demographic characteristics of the purchasers, and state-level demographics. We also use data
from a single major insurance ﬁrm that provided offer prices for a family policy from a set of randomly selected zip codes. Both datasets suggest a strong statistical relationship between regulation
and insurance prices.
KEYWORDS: health insurance, insurance regulations, consumer directed health care

∗

This work was initiated while the authors were working at the Council of Economic Advisers, and
support from that agency is gratefully acknowledged. We are also indebted to the following people
for providing data: Emily Fox, Donna Horoschak, Nora Kraemer, Gary Lauer, Paul Mackun,
Brian McManus, Carla Plaza, Joel Slackman, Anne Sluck, Brian Webb, Kathryn Wilber, and Tom
Wilder. Harvey Rosen, Andrew Samwick, Anne Case, and Uwe Reinhardt provided very useful
comments. All remaining errors are owned solely by the authors.

Kowalski et al.: State Health Insurance Regulations

Introduction
State health insurance regulations play a key role in several health care proposals
and policies. For example, proposed Association Health Plans would allow small
businesses to purchase group health insurance that is free of some forms of state
health insurance regulation.1 Other proposals would circumvent many state
health insurance regulations by allowing consumers to purchase health insurance
across state lines.2
An example of an existing policy affected by state health insurance
regulations is the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003, which
established Health Savings Accounts (HSAs). HSAs are tax-advantaged accounts
that must be coupled with high-deductible health insurance policies. If state
insurance regulations make high-deductible policies prohibitively expensive or
unavailable, the adoption of these accounts could be substantially hindered.
This study examines the impact of state regulations on the price of family
and individual polices in the nongroup market. We focus on high-deductible
policies because of their importance to the use of HSAs, and because they have
not been the subject of prior research. We use a unique and rich data set on actual
insurance policies sold through a large Internet health insurance distributor to
examine the impact of four types of regulations—1) community rating, 2)
guarantee issue, 3) any willing provider, and 4) mandated benefits—on policy
prices, controlling for policy characteristics, demographic characteristics of the
purchasers, and state-level demographics. We also use data from a single major
insurance firm that provided offer prices for a family policy from a set of
randomly selected zip codes. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study
of how community rating and guarantee issue regulations affect policy prices in
the individual market.
We find that the existence of community rating regulations raises
premiums by 10.2 to 17.1 percent for individual policies, and 20.9 to 33.1 percent
for family policies. We also find that guarantee issue regulations that accompany
community rating regulations in New Jersey are associated with premium
increases of well over 100 percent for individual and family policies. The effects
of mandated benefits and any willing provider regulations tend to be positive, but
these results are sensitive to the econometric specification. We also find that the
terms of the insurance contract—deductibles, coinsurance rates, stop loss limits—
are also affected by the regulatory regime.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 provides background
information on the nongroup market for health insurance, including a description
of the regulations whose impact we investigate in this paper and a brief review of
1
2

See CBO (2000) for a discussion of Association Health Plans.
For example, see “Health Care Choice Act,” HR 4662 of the 108th Congress.
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the state of research on this topic. Section 2 describes our data sources and
presents descriptive statistics. Section 3 contains our empirical results. Section 4
concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of our findings.

1. Background
Nongroup Market
The nongroup market for insurance—the market in which insurance policies are
purchased directly by individuals and families instead of through an employer—is
a relatively small market. In 2003 only 9.2 percent of the population (26.5
million people) had health insurance that was purchased directly, compared to
60.4 percent of the population (174 million) that obtained their insurance through
an employer3 (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2004). The relatively small size of the
individual market compared to the employment-based market is generally
attributed to a combination of economies of scale for, and favorable tax treatment
of, employment-based insurance (ERP 2004).
Despite its current size, understanding this market is particularly important
when considering policy changes that increase incentives for individuals to drop
employment-based coverage in favor of direct purchase. For example, analysts
have argued that the creation of health savings accounts by the MMA will lead
young, healthy employees to opt out of employer pools to purchase cheaper
policies in the individual market (Burman and Blumberg 2003). Other proposals
suggest eliminating or reducing the tax-advantaged status of employment-based
insurance even more dramatically than was done with the MMA, further
strengthening incentives to purchase insurance in the individual market (Cogan et
al., 2004).
Regulations in the Nongroup Market
Although there are numerous ways to regulate insurance markets, a few
regulations are often suspected of having a disproportionately large effect on
markets. We focus on four broad classes of regulations: community rating,
guarantee issue, any willing provider, and mandated benefits.
Community rating regulations limit premium differences across policies.
The most stringent form requires insurers to offer the same premium to every
individual, regardless of age, gender, or health status. These regulations are
usually motivated on equity grounds. However, such regulations may lead to
3

An additional 26.6 percent received insurance through government plans.
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adverse selection, thereby making policies prohibitively expensive for healthy
individuals.
Guarantee issue regulations limit the ability of insurers to deny coverage
to potential and existing customers. Insurers could circumvent guarantee issue
requirements by offering only very expensive policies to high-risk individuals. In
practice, however, guarantee issue regulations usually accompany community
rating regulations. It is not obvious how these regulations affect prices.
Any willing provider regulations restrict the ability of insurers to exclude
hospitals and doctors from their networks. Typically, such regulations are
motivated by a desire to offer consumers more choice and flexibility. However,
such regulations may hinder insurers’ ability to contain costs.
Mandated benefits regulations require insurers to cover particular
treatments. We focus on “service” and “provider” mandates. Service mandates
require insurers to offer coverage for particular medical conditions. Provider
mandates require insurers to offer coverage for specific health care providers such
as chiropractors. Mandates likely increase the cost of policies, although the
magnitude is uncertain.
Previous Studies
A few studies have focused on the individual market. For example, Chollet
(2003) gives an excellent overview; Pauly and Nichols (2002) provide additional
information on the workings of this market; and Pollitz and Thomas (2001)
present some small-sample statistics on insurer underwriting behavior. The effect
of state-level regulations on health insurance markets generally (individual and
group markets) has been the focus of a number of studies. The Congressional
Budget Office reported a wide variety of estimates of the effect of regulations on
the price of insurance (Congressional Budget Office, 2000). Some specific
examples include a study by Gruber (1994), which examined the effect of a
handful of presumably high-cost regulations on take-up rates and found little
effect. Zuckerman and Rajan (1999) found that select sets of reforms increase
uninsurance rates and reduce private coverage. More dramatic effects are
reported by Goodman and Musgrave (1988) and Sloan and Conover (1998).
Our analysis is unique in that it focuses on high-deductible policies and
that it examines policies from a broad cross section of the United States (fortytwo states). The focus on high-deductible policies is of particular importance
given the restrictions in the MMA that only allow health savings accounts when
coupled with high-deductible policies. Our use of specially constructed
proprietary data on actual polices and price quotes makes our analysis particularly
relevant for policy.
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2. Data
Data Sources
Our primary data set contains an unusually rich set of information on highdeductible, nongroup health insurance policies sold through a large health
insurance distributor. These data were provided by eHealthInsurance, the largest
health insurance distributor in the United States. Our data include all highdeductible nongroup policies sold through eHealthInsurance in 2003. “Highdeductible” is defined as at least $1,000 for individuals and $2,000 for families, in
accordance with the requirements for HSA-eligibility established in December
2003. By early 2004 approximately 57 percent of individual policies sold through
eHealthInsurance had a deductible of $1,000 or more, nearly 40 percent of family
policies had a deductible of $2,000 or more, and the proportion of high-deductible
policies sold was growing steadily.
Our data represent a total of 24,903 individual policies and 7,293 family
policies sold in forty-two states in 2003. The data include detailed information on
the policies as well as the purchasers. Observed policy characteristics include the
premium, deductible, coinsurance rate, and out-of-pocket limit. Observed
purchaser characteristics include gender, age, smoking status, student status,
purchase location (state and metropolitan area), and, for family policies, the
number of individuals covered by the policy. Importantly, these purchaser
characteristics include all nongeographic information collected by
eHealthInsurance before offering an insurance quote.
Because of confidentiality issues, these data (referred to hereafter as the
“sales data”) were not collected such that each observation is a single insurance
policy. Instead, these data were constructed as cells containing unique
combinations of the following variables: metropolitan area, state, number of
covered individuals, gender, smoking status, student status, and out-of-pocket
maximum (stop loss limit). The remaining policy and purchaser variables are
reported as means within each cell: premium, deductible, coinsurance rate, and
age of policyholder. Thus our data contains 8,015 individual and 5,022 family
observations representing the 32,196 policies referenced above. All demographic
characteristics refer to the purchaser of the policy. The data include the number
of policies each observation represents, allowing us to weight statistics
appropriately.4 Despite the aggregation, the level of detail is high—over half of
the family observations and over 15 percent of individual observations represent a
single policy.
Because our data from eHealthInsurance only include policies that were
purchased, it only allows us to observe the effect of regulation on the reduced
form outcome of supply and demand forces. For example, if regulation in a given
4

All reported statistics are weighted by the number of policies within each observation.
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state makes health insurance particularly costly, insurers may respond by offering
less generous policies, and consumers may respond by purchasing less generous
policies, but we cannot disentangle these responses. Furthermore, also on the
demand side, it is possible that consumers who are more likely to consume
medical care based on observed or unobserved characteristics are attracted into
the nongroup markets in states with more regulation. In our analysis of the sales
data we try to address demand-side factors by examining and controlling for
observed differences in policy and consumer characteristics.
In addition, we analyze a second data set that allows us to isolate
geographic variation in premiums by eliminating variation in product attributes
and consumer characteristics. This data set was provided by Golden Rule, a
major provider of insurance in the nongroup market. In contrast to our
eHealthInsurance data set, which contains information on nongroup health
insurance policies sold through a health insurance distributor, our Golden Rule
data set contains information on the price at which nongroup health insurance
policies are offered by a single large insurance provider. Golden Rule is one of
the largest providers of high-deductible policies through eHealthInsurance, which
strengthens the grounds for comparison between the policies purchased through
eHealthInsurance and the policies offered by Golden Rule. The offer data will
only reflect demand-level factors insofar as Golden Rule changes its premiums in
response to demand in particular geographic locations.
Golden Rule compiled our offer data by reporting the price (monthly
premium) at which the provider would offer a particular policy to a family with
predetermined characteristics across a set of randomly selected zip codes.5
Specifically, this data set reports the premium quoted in 2004 for a family
nongroup policy with a deductible of $3,540 and 100 percent coverage after the
deductible to a family of four, ages thirty-five, thirty-five, ten and six. These data
include price quotes for 1,056 zip codes in all twenty-three states where Golden
Rule operates.6 Because these data (hereafter referred to as the “offer data”) are
conditioned on values of the characteristics of the policy and the purchasing
family, the only variables of interest (controls aside) are the quoted premium and
the measures of the regulatory environment in the state and metropolitan area in
question.
We obtained data on state regulations that apply to the sale of health
insurance policies from a variety of sources. Data on mandated benefits are
drawn from two sources: a Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association (BCBS)
5

Five zip codes were randomly selected from each MSA code (2-4 digit) for each state served by
Golden Rule.
6
These states include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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compilation of such benefits, and a similar compilation from the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). The main advantage of the BCBS data
set is that it summarizes regulations in a standardized form. One disadvantage is
that it includes regulations that may not apply to the nongroup market. To
supplement and check these data, we also use the more detailed but less
comprehensive NCSL data. Data on guarantee issue and community rating
regulations are from data compiled by the Georgetown Health Policy Institute.
We also collected several variables from other sources to serve as controls.
We use the Medicare wage index for fiscal year 2003 to account for MSA-level
geographic variation in the cost of providing health care.7 We also have data on
state premium taxes compiled the by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC). Finally, we use a number of state-level demographic
variables to account for state-level demand for insurance.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 demonstrates the extent of the variation in the regulatory environment
across states, with respect to regulations that apply to the sale of health insurance
policies. The top panel presents descriptive statistics for all fifty states. It shows
that the median state has twenty mandated benefits, and that the variation in the
number of mandates is substantial: the mean number of mandates is twenty-three,
and the standard deviation across states is eight. This table also shows the
number of states with any willing provider regulations (19), community rating
regulations (7), and guarantee issue regulations (5).
The samples in our analysis are restricted to only those states in which we
observe policies being sold or offered, but the across-state regulatory intensity
remains substantial. We summarize the regulatory environments in the states in
the sales and offer data sets in the middle and bottom panels of Table 1,
respectively. The middle panel shows that in the forty-two states for which we
have sales data, the median number of mandated benefits (21) is similar to the
median over all states (20). The bottom panel shows that in the twenty-three
states for which we have offer data the median number of mandated benefits is the
same as for the median over all states. In addition, the fraction of states in the
sales sample with any willing provider regulations is similar to the fraction for all
states. The fraction of states in the offer sample with any willing provider
regulations is slightly lower.
Table 1 also shows that states with community rating and guarantee issue
regulations are disproportionately selected out of our sales and offer data sets. Of
7

The Medicare wage index is computed annually by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS). It is used to adjust hospital payments for geographic variation in hospital wage
costs.
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the eight states in which eHealthInsurance sold no policies in 2003,8 four states—
Maine, Massachusetts, New York, and Vermont—had guarantee issue and
community rating regulations. Furthermore, Golden Rule does not offer policies
in any states with guarantee issue or community rating regulations. It is possible
that the absence of states with community rating and guarantee issue regulations
from our data is meaningful. Correspondence with eHealthInsurance suggests
that the existence of community rating and guarantee issue regulations is indeed a
contributory factor in explaining the absences of policies in some states, but
missing states often have other regulations that limit the market, making a
definitive conclusion elusive.
We cannot formally examine the effect of community rating and guarantee
issue regulations on the premiums in states that do not appear in our data.
However, we can and do estimate the impact of these regulations on premiums in
the states that appear in the sales data. New Jersey, Washington, and Oregon are
the three states in our sample with community rating, and New Jersey also has
guarantee issue. Since New Jersey is the only state in our sample with guarantee
issue, and it also has community rating, we cannot separately identify the effects
of guarantee issue and guarantee issue coupled with community rating. However,
in 2003 all states with guarantee issue also had community rating, so the
combined effect of both regulations is relevant for policy. We interpret all of our
guarantee issue results subject to the caveat that the effects that they measure are
based only on New Jersey. We control for other observed characteristics of New
Jersey, but unobserved idiosyncratic factors could affect our results.9
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sales data.10 The top panel
shows summary statistics for policies sold to individuals, while the bottom panel
shows summary statistics for policies sold to families. Looking first at the
individual policies, note that the policies in this sample vary not just in their price
but also their terms: for example, deductibles in this sample range from $1,000 to
$10,000; coinsurance rates range from 0 to 50 percent. The mean policy has a
deductible of about $2,300, a coinsurance rate of about 17 percent, and sells for a
$130 monthly premium. This table also displays the means, standard deviations,
and ranges for the characteristics of the purchasers of these policies: it shows that
while the average purchaser of a policy in this data set was thirty-five years old,
8

eHealthInsurance sold no high-deductible policies in the following eight states in 2003: Hawaii,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia.
First-dollar coverage policies were available in New York. HSA-eligible policies were introduced
by eHealthInsurance in North Dakota in 2004.
9
See Monheit et al. (2004) for more details about the New Jersey health insurance market.
10
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for the subset of the sales sample for which we have
nonmissing observations for all policy and purchaser variables of interest (i.e., the regression
samples). As a result, the number of observations is slightly lower for this table than for the full
sample, as described above.
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male, a nonsmoker, and not a student, there is substantial variation in these
characteristics across observations.
Turning to the bottom panel of this table and the sample of family policies,
these same statistics tell a broadly similar story: variation in both the
characteristics of the policies and the characteristics of the purchasers is
substantial. There are some noteworthy differences from the individual data,
however. First, because these policies cover three people each on average, the
cost and the terms of the policies are quite different. The mean policy has a
deductible of about $3,700, a coinsurance rate of about 19 percent, and sells for a
$230 monthly premium. Second, the purchasing individual for family policies is
more likely to be male and is slightly older than the average purchaser of an
individual policy. Considering both the individual and family data, it is worth
noting that the variation in the policy and the purchaser characteristics is likely to
contribute substantially to the observed variation in monthly premiums, making
all of these variables important controls when seeking to identify the independent
effect on premiums of the type of state regulations described in Table 1.
Table 3 breaks out the statistics in Table 2 by state regulatory
environments.11 It compares the means of the variables from Table 2 across states
grouped according to whether they do or do not have any willing provider,
community rating, or guarantee issue regulations, and whether they have more or
fewer than the median number of mandated benefits. In the top panel, which
displays these comparisons for individual policies, we see that states with more
than the median of twenty-one mandates have an average monthly premium of
$135; states with twenty-one or fewer mandates have a lower average monthly
premium of $119. States with any willing provider regulations have an average
monthly premium of $136; states without any willing provider regulations have a
price that is $7 lower. Community rating has a large impact on premium—$154
versus $128—although the number of states in our sample with such regulations
is much smaller. Finally, the difference in price for guarantee issue regulations is
a substantial $100 ($228-$128), but New Jersey is the only state in our sample
with such a law and it also has community rating.
The top panel of Table 3 also shows how the policies, as well as the
buyers of those policies, differ across these groups of states. For example, the
data on policy characteristics appear to show that the presence of regulations
tends to be associated with less generous insurance (higher coinsurance rates,
higher deductibles, higher stop loss limits). The characteristics of the purchasers
of these policies, however, do not exhibit any clear pattern of differences between
states with or without regulations, or high levels of mandated benefits. This is
11

Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for the subset of the sales sample for which we have
nonmissing observations for all policy and purchaser variables of interest (i.e., the regression
samples). The sample in Table 3 is the same as the sample in Table 2.
http://www.bepress.com/fhep/11/2/8
DOI: 10.2202/1558-9544.1129

8

Kowalski et al.: State Health Insurance Regulations

suggestive evidence against the possibility that “highly” regulated states attract a
different mix of enrollees than “low” regulated states, although we cannot rule out
selection based on unobserved characteristics such as health status. In summary,
the comparisons in Table 3 suggest that the sample of purchasers does not vary in
important ways across regulatory environments, but that the policies themselves
do, along with their prices.
The bottom panel of Table 3 presents the same exercise, but for family
policies. The results are consistent: regulation is associated with more expensive
and less generous insurance. The characteristics of the purchasers do not exhibit
any clear pattern of differences between states with or without regulations, or
between states with higher or lower levels of mandated benefits.
Table 4 describes the offer data. The top panel shows the mean, standard
deviation, and range for the cost of monthly premiums in this sample. The level
of the premium in the offer data does not include underwriting costs, which can
lead to higher premiums.12 Still, the mean premium in the offer data, $290.25, is
higher than the mean family premium in the sales data, $233.00. This difference
in the mean premium could reflect differences in the states and populations
included in each data set. We might also expect to observe higher premiums in
the offer data than we do in the sales data if consumers offered the highest prices
do not purchase health insurance at all, or instead purchase policies that are less
generous.
Since the offer data set was constructed by eliciting offer premiums for a
particular policy (deductible of $3,540; 100 percent coverage after deductible) for
a particular hypothetical buyer (family of four, children ages ten and six), there is
no variation in either the characteristics of the policies or the characteristics of the
(hypothetical) purchasers across observations as there was in the sales data. Still,
we observe substantial geographic variation in premium prices. The bottom panel
breaks this out by state regulatory environments. Consistent with the evidence
from the sales data, premium prices are higher in states with more than the
median number of mandated benefits ($319 versus $260), and higher in states
with any willing provider regulations ($311 versus $278). This is interesting
primarily in that with this data there is no opportunity for price differences to be
driven by differences in the unmeasured aspects of the policies (e.g., network of
physician, quality of insurer), something we could not rule out in Table 3.

12

Underwriting should not present a problem for our analysis of the Golden Rule data if holding
purchaser characteristics constant holds underwriting propensity constant across geographic areas.
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3. Results
Our primary interest in this paper is in understanding the relationship between the
regulatory environment in a state and the price of high-deductible health
insurance policies to the consumer. To describe this relationship, we ran
regressions of the form:

premiumi , m, s

E0  E1  regulations  E2  insurancei ,m, s  E3  controlsm, s  H i ,m, s

where premium is the monthly premium charged to individual i, in metro area m,
in state s; regulation is a vector of variables that measure the regulatory
environment in state s; insurance is a vector of controls that describe both the
purchaser of the policy and the policy they purchase; and controls is a vector of
controls at the level of the MSA and state. All regressions are weighted to reflect
the fact that observations may represent more than one policy, as described above.
The variables of interest in our analysis – regulation – measure the
regulatory environment in the state in question. The variables we will use for
these purposes include: 1) a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a
state has any community rating regulations, 2) a dichotomous variable indicating
whether or not a state has any guarantee issue regulations, 3) a count of the total
number of mandated benefits in a given state, and 4) a dichotomous variable
indicating whether or not a state has any willing provider regulations. Our
insurance level controls include variables describing both the policy itself
(coinsurance rate, deductible, stop loss limit), as well as the purchaser of the
policy (age, smoking status, student status, gender, and family size, where
appropriate). Our controls are those discussed in the data section.
We run very similar analyses across our two data sets—the sales data set
and the offer data set. We present below the results of parallel analyses of these
data sets.
Sales Data
Table 5 gives the results for individual policies using the sales data. This data set
is unusual in the richness of the information available on the insurance contract;
we thus begin by examining a regression using only the terms of the insurance
contract (Column 1). Parameters that lead to higher expected out-of-pocket costs
lead to a lower expected insurance premium: the estimated coefficient for the log
of the stop loss is -0.045; the estimated deductible coefficient is -0.019; and the
estimated coinsurance coefficient is -0.0004. All but the coinsurance coefficient
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Characteristics of the
policyholder are also highly statistically significant: an additional year in age
http://www.bepress.com/fhep/11/2/8
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increases the expected premium by about 1 percent; smokers pay 5.2 percent
more than nonsmokers; students pay 16.7 percent less than nonstudents and males
pay 10.7 percent less than females.
Column 2 adds the four regulation variables. The existence of a
community rating regulation raises the expected premium by 10.2 percent, with a
t-statistic of 6.8. Guarantee issue regulations are estimated to increase the
expected premium in New Jersey by an astounding 227 percent, with a t-statistic
of 32.1.13 It is worth remembering that this large value stems from a regression
that controls for the generosity of the insurance policy; the less generous
insurance terms we observe in regulated states will tend to be reflected as higher
policy prices when the terms of insurance are taken into account. The estimated
parameter on mandated benefits is also statistically significant and has a value of
0.0074, which is interpreted to mean that increasing the number of mandates by
one increases the expected premium by 0.74 percent (t-statistic of 12.3). The
existence of any willing provider regulations is estimated to lower the expected
premium by 4.3 percent (t-statistic of 4.3).
Column 3 adds several controls for MSA and state characteristics that
might have an effect on premiums: a measure of health care costs, the tax rate on
insurance premiums, the log of the 2000 population count, the log of per capita
income, the proportion of the population age sixty-five or older (to control for the
percent of the population eligible for Medicare), the proportion of the population
that is African American, the proportion of the population residing in urban
locations, the proportion of the population with employer-provided health
insurance, and the proportion of the population that is not citizens of the United
States. Adding in these controls slightly increases the coefficient for community
rating to 0.133, and the guarantee issue coefficient falls slightly to 1.176
(implying an estimated percentage increase in premiums of 224 percent); both
remain highly statistically significant. However, the coefficient on mandated
benefit is no longer statistically different from zero. The any willing provider
coefficient is now positive with a t-statistic of 2.57.
We conducted a number of sensitivity and specification tests, in part to
understand why the coefficients on mandated benefits and any willing provider
changed substantially with the addition of state-level variables. We found that
observations in the state with the most mandated benefits (forty-eight, Maryland)
had a disproportionately large effect on the determination of the regression
coefficients. Column 4 runs the same specification as Column 3, but excludes
110 observations from the outlier state. Community rating and guarantee issue
13

The estimated coefficient is 1.186. We compute the percentage effect on the conditional mean
by using (exp(1.186) – 1) because the large value of the coefficient makes the coefficient itself a
poor estimate for the percentage change in the conditional mean of price. We treat all estimated
parameters of guarantee issue similarly.
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estimates are again large and statistically significant, but now mandated benefits
are estimated to have a positive effect on expected premiums (0.0036); any
willing provider is not statistically different from zero. One partial explanation
for Maryland’s disproportionate weight is that it has by far the highest number of
mandates, forty-eight, where the median number is twenty, and the second highest
is forty (Connecticut). As a more general test of the influence of outliers, we next
dropped observations from the extremes from both tails: we drop the three states
with the lowest number of mandates—Idaho (6), Alabama (10), Iowa (12)—and
the three states with the highest number of mandates—Minnesota (37),
Connecticut (40), Maryland (48). The results are reported in Column 5. Again,
community rating and guarantee issue regulations have a relatively large effect on
expected premiums; mandated benefits are estimated to increase expected
premiums by 0.26 percent per mandate; any willing provider regulations are
estimated to decrease premiums by 5.6 percent.
In summary, the community rating and guarantee issue regulations appear
to increase premiums substantially. This result is robust to a number of
specifications.14 The results on mandated benefits and any willing provider
regulations are more tenuous and are sensitive to the data used and the variables
included in the regression.
Table 6 reports coefficients from a similar analysis using family policies.
The structure of the columns is the same as for the individuals policies reported in
Table 5. The results are quite similar to those found with individual policies: the
variables measuring terms of the contract tend to be highly significant and of the
expected sign. Community rating is estimated to raise the average premium by
20.9 to 33.1 percent, depending on the specification. Guarantee issue is again
large and highly statistically significant, ranging in estimated premium increases
from 108 percent (Column 4) to 191 percent (Column 2). As we found with the
individual policies, the inclusion of Maryland tends to have a large impact on the
estimated coefficients of mandated benefits and any willing provider regulations.
We performed numerous analyses to assess the robustness of our results. For
example, we used several different measures of mandates. We also tried
alternative functional forms for the estimation equation. The results tended to
confirm the findings of our baseline model.15

14

Although the estimated effect of guarantee issue is large and highly statistically significant, New
Jersey is the only state in our sample with this regulation; our guarantee issue coefficient is thus
measuring the price difference between New Jersey and other states, controlling for other
observable characteristics.
15
The results reported here are based on BCBS mandate data because it is more comprehensive,
but regressions with NCSL data yield similar results. We also tested a variety of state-level
demographic controls, and the results were generally similar to the reported results.
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Offer Data
Table 7 presents the results of this analysis for our offer data. These regressions
are similar to those above, but because this data set consists of offered prices on a
uniform policy there is no need for controls on policy and purchaser
characteristics. All observations in this data set are for provided price quotes for a
given policy (family of four; ages thirty-five, thirty-five, ten and six; deductible of
$3,540; 100 percent coverage after deductible) from a set of randomly selected
zip codes from all twenty-three states where the provider operates. Note that this
sample is not random across states: there are no observations in states with
community rating or guarantee issue regulations, but we are able to estimate the
effect of mandates and any willing provider regulations on offer prices. This data
set is particularly valuable because it allows us to control for company-specific
and policy-specific aspects that we could not measure (or measure only
imperfectly) with the sales data. The use of offer prices also provides a useful
contrast to the transaction prices in the sales data because the offer prices will not
be subject to the same kind of demand-side forces as sales data. We use these
data to estimate a set of regressions similar to those run on the sales data.
Table 7 gives the results from the various specifications. Using only the
regulation variables, the estimated coefficient on mandated benefits is 0.011 with
a t-statistic of 11.0. The estimated coefficient on any willing provider is 0.097
with a t-statistic of 7.46. Adding state-level controls leads to an coefficient on
mandated benefits (0.0015) that is not statistically different from zero, but any
willing provider is larger at 0.135 with a t-statistic of 9.0. Dropping outliers on
the extremes of mandated benefits again leads to a statistically significant
coefficient on mandated benefits, and the coefficient on any willing provider
regulations remains relatively large and statistically significant.
Robustness Issues
Our primary measures of regulations are similar to what has been used in previous
research on state-level regulations (e.g., Sloan and Conover 1998). We use
dummy variables for any willing provider regulations, community rating and
guarantee issue regulations, and a simple count for the number of mandates.
These measures are imperfect for at least three reasons: 1) different types of
mandates are likely to have different effects on premiums; 2) details of
implementation and enforcement likely differ across states and affect the impact
on premiums; 3) variations in market structure (number of competing insurers,
HMO penetration, etc.) could interact with regulations in a number of complex
ways.
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However, these measurement difficulties would tend to bias the regression
estimates toward zero. The fact that most of the empirical estimates turn out to be
relatively large and statistically significant is surprising. Being sensitive to the
weaknesses of our measures, we tried a variety of specifications that are not
reported in this paper. For example, we tried dummy variables for individual
types of mandates and for sets of mandates that a priori we would expect to be
particularly expensive (Gruber, 1994). We also experimented with nonlinear
specifications of mandates (including a squared term; replacing the continuous
measure of mandates with a set of dummy variables). We found that using large
sets of dummy variables resulted in problems of multicollinearity: jointly the set
of dummy variables tended to be highly statistically significant, but the signs and
magnitudes had no coherent pattern. Specifications that included a squared term
showed a declining marginal impact of regulations over most of the relevant
range.
As with most cross-sectional work, we are also vulnerable to issues of
endogeneity and omitted variable bias. In particular, it is possible that our
regulation measures are correlated with unmeasured aspects of the insurance
market within each state. We attempt to account for these issues by including the
state and MSA level variables. We also examined additional specifications that
include dummies for the four census regions or nine census divisions, and the
basic conclusions did not change. With mandates, it is plausible that such
regulations are passed due to concentrated, idiosyncratic political efforts of small
sets of individuals or groups—chiropractors agitating for coverage of their
services, distraught families petitioning for coverage of rare conditions, and so on.
Treating such mandates as random events and therefore exogenous seems unlikely
to lead to systematic overstatement of the actual effects.
It is unclear how the other three regulatory variables might be biased.
Because we have controls for the general cost of health care and for the demand
for insurance, the most likely problem is that these variables are correlated with
other state-level regulatory policies. For example, New Jersey implemented a
number of reform measures that have been examined elsewhere (Monheit, et al.,
2004). It is possible that the regulatory variables are picking up other aspects of
the regulatory climate. This is an issue that deserves further study, but goes
beyond the scope of this paper.16
16

We also used some additional data and estimation techniques to account for possible
endogeneity. For example, we gathered state-level demographic data and included these variables
both as additional regressors and as instruments for the regulation variables. The results were
mixed and again presented no coherent economic story. For example, the IV specifications were
quite sensitive to the choice of instruments, with relatively large standard errors. This is not
surprising given that we have no strong theoretical justification for using demographic variables as
instruments for regulation variables. We were still able to obtain statistically significant
http://www.bepress.com/fhep/11/2/8
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4. Summary
This research suggests that state health insurance regulations have a substantial
effect on the price and structure of insurance policies in the nongroup market.
Using a rich data set on actual insurance contracts, we find that policies in
regulated states tend to result in less generous insurance polices—higher
deductibles, higher coinsurance rates, and higher stop loss limits. We also find
that, controlling for the terms of the insurance contract, the existence of
community rating regulations raises premiums by 10.2 to 17.1 percent for
individual policies, and 20.9 to 33.1 percent for family policies. The combination
of guarantee issue regulations with community rating regulations in New Jersey is
associated with premium increases of well over 100 percent for individual and
family policies (108 to 227 percent). To our knowledge, this is the first empirical
evidence of the price implications of these two types of regulations. It is also
interesting to note that four of the eight states missing from our analysis have
forms of guarantee issue and community rating regulations, including two states
with large populations, Massachusetts and New York. This absence suggests
additional implications of such regulations, although we cannot run any formal
tests. Mandated benefits and any willing provider regulations also tend to be
associated with higher premiums, but the results are sensitive to the econometric
specification.
We also use a second data set consisting of offer prices for a given family
insurance policy from a single firm. By construction, the only variation in prices
comes from geographic variation across the twenty-three states that the company
serves. In this data set, we estimate that mandated benefits increase premiums,
but the estimated coefficients are not statistically different from zero when we
include state- and MSA-level controls. Any willing provider regulations are
estimated to raise premiums by 9.7 to 13.5 percent depending on the specification,
and these results are always highly statistically significant. Although we have
focused on high-deductible plans, it is plausible that analysis of other types of
health insurance policies would yield similar results.
As is true of the results of any econometric analysis, our results must be
interpreted with caution. Of necessity, this study relies on cross-state variation in
regulations to estimate the price effect of regulations. Idiosyncratic state
characteristics correlated with the propensity to enact mandates may influence the
results. We have abstracted from this issue by estimating reduced-form results;
further exploration of potential endogeneity and omitted variable concerns is an
important area for future work.

coefficients for the regulations variables with most specifications, but the choice of what results to
present, given the space constraints, would have been arbitrary.
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In conclusion, our results provide evidence of the costs of state health
insurance regulations. We recognize that these regulations presumably have
benefits as well, in the form of increased treatment options, flexibility in choosing
a provider, and equity in pricing. We leave it to policy makers to weigh
costs against potential benefits.

Table 1: State Health Insurance Regulations Across States - All States,
Sales Sample and Offer Sample
All States (n=50)
Mandated Benefits (count)
Any Willing Provider (indicator)
Community Rating (indicator)
Guarantee Issue (indicator)

Median
20
0
0
0

Mean
23.00
0.38
0.14
0.10

Std.
Dev.
8.14
0.49
0.35
0.30

Min Max
6
48
0
1
0
1
0
1

Count
19
7
5

Sales Sample (n=42)
Mandated Benefits (count)
Any Willing Provider (indicator)
Community Rating (indicator)
Guarantee Issue (indicator)

Median
21
0
0
0

Mean
23.33
0.38
0.07
0.02

Std.
Dev.
8.33
0.49
0.26
0.15

Min Max
6
48
0
1
0
1
0
1

Count
16
3
1

Std.
Median Mean
Dev.
Min Max
Count
Offer Sample (n=23)
20
22.74
8.23
12
48
Mandated Benefits (count)
0
0.30
0.47
0
1
7
Any Willing Provider (indicator)
Notes: The panels of this table present statistics describing the variation in regulations across
states for all fifty states, the sample of states in the sales data set, and the sample of states in
the offer data set, respectively. The median, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and
maximum value are shown for each regulation measure. For indicator measures, the number
of states with that regulation is also given, in the column labeled "Count."
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Table 2: Policy and Purchaser Descriptive Statistics
- Sales Data
Individual policies
Premium ($)
Coinsurance (rate)
Deductible (x$1000)

Mean
130.5
17.20
2.31

Std. Dev.
52.6
11.31
1.57

Min
50
0
1

Max
537
50
10

Stop loss limit ($)
Age
Male (indicator)
Student (indicator)
Smoker (indicator)
N (observations): 6905
N (polices): 23219

3,804
35.03
0.53
0.06
0.10

1,890
8.34
0.50
0.24
0.30

500
0
0
0
0

16,000
64
1
1
1

Family policies
Premium ($)
Coinsurance (rate)
Deductible (x$1000)

Mean
233.0
18.99
3.67

Std. Dev.
118.0
12.16
1.70

Min
51
0
2

Max
1295
50
10

9,522
4,784
1,000 60,000
Stop loss limit ($)
40.54
8.28
0
64
Age
0.69
0.46
0
1
Male (indicator)
0.03
0.16
0
1
Student (indicator)
0.10
0.30
0
1
Smoker (indicator)
2.98
1.08
2
8
Family size
N (observations): 4,390
N (polices):
6,592
Notes: The panels of this table present statistics describing the
policies and purchasers in the sales data for the sample of
individual policies and the sample of family policies, respectively.
The mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum value are
shown for each variable. Also shown are the numbers of
observations in each sample, as well as the number of policies
those observations represent.
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Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

Any Willing Provider

Community Rating

Guarantee Issue

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

Any Willing Provider

Community Rating

Guarantee Issue

17.8
15.7
17.4
17.1
26.7
16.2
47.2
16.5

135
119
136
129
154
128
228
128

7,914
2,187

3,544
2,181

2,953
2,135

2,317
2,301

Deductible

Coinsurance

20.6
15.7
19.0
19.0
32.3
18.0
47.7
18.1

Monthly
Premium

246
208
253
224
331
225
500
225

8,527
3,519

6,589
3,440

4,109
3,477

3,694
3,614

Deductible

4,851
3,780

4,804
3,693

3,690
3,837

3,624
4,273

5,023
9,664

8,223
9,627

9,416
9,570

9,213
10,157

Stop Loss
Limit

Policy Characteristic Means ($)

Coinsurance

Stop Loss
Limit

Policy Characteristic Means ($)
Monthly
Premium

42.9
40.5

41.6
40.5

41.3
40.2

40.1
41.5

Age

34.8
35.0

36.4
34.9

34.9
35.1

34.4
36.7

Age

7
6

6
6

5
6

7
5

% Student

11
10

10
10

14
9

9
14

% Smoker

76
69

73
69

73
67

66
75

% Male

8
10

8
10

12
10

9
13

% Smoker

3.4
3.0

3.1
3.0

3.1
2.9

3.0
2.9

Individuals
per policy

Purchaser Characteristic Means
Policy Holder
# of

54
53

53
53

55
53

53
53

% Male

Purchaser Characteristic Means

1
41

3
39

16
26

21
21

509
22,710

2,245
20,974

5,032
18,187

16,878
6,341

Policies

195
6,397

475
6,117

1,984
4,608

4,394
2,198

Policies

Counts

States

1
41

3
39

16
26

21
21

States

Counts

http://www.bepress.com/fhep/11/2/8
DOI: 10.2202/1558-9544.1129

Notes: The panels of this table present statistics describing the policies and purchasers in the sales data for the sample of individual and the sample of family policies, respectively,
broken out by the state regulatory environment (presence or absence of any willing provider, community rating, and guarantee issue laws; above or below the median number of
mandated benefits). Means are shown for the descriptive variables. Counts of states and policies are also presented.

More than 21
21 or fewer

Mandated Benefits

Family Policies

More than 21
21 or fewer

Mandated Benefits

Individual Policies

Table 3: Summary Statistics by State Regulatory Environment, Sales Data
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Table 4: Summary Statistics, Offer Data
Summary Statistics

Premium ($)
n = 997

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

290.35

72.4

146

824.5

Summary Statistics by State Regulatory Environment
Policy Characteristic Means ($)

Counts

Monthly
Premium

States

Policies

Mandated Benefits

More than 20
20 or fewer

319
260

11
12

511
486

Any Willing Provider

Yes
No

311
278

7
16

377
620

Notes: The top panel of this table presents descriptive statistics for the offer data. Notice that because this data was
constructed by eliciting offer prices (premiums) for a particular policy for a particular hypothetical purchaser, the only
variable of interest is the monthly premium. The bottom panel of this table breaks this out by the state regulatory
environment (presence or absence of any willing provider laws; above or below the median number of mandated
benefits). None of the states in the offer data set report community rating laws or gurantee issue laws. Counts of states
and policies are also presented.
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Table 5: Regressions Using Individual Policies, Sales Data
Dependent Variable: Ln(Premium)

(1)

(2)

Column
(3)

(4)

(5)

Omit State with
Highest Number
of Mandates

Omit Top 3 and
Bottom 3 States
(Number of
Mandates)

Regulatory Variables:
Community Rating (indicator)

0.102***
(0.015)

0.133***
(0.018)

0.163***
(0.018)

0.171***
(0.018)

Guarantee Issue (indicator)

1.186***
(0.037)

1.176***
(0.048)

1.095***
(0.048)

1.184***
(0.051)

Mandated Benefits (count)

0.0074***
(0.0006)

-0.0008
(0.0010)

0.0036***
(0.0011)

0.0026**
(0.0013)

Any Willing Provider (indicator)

-0.043***
(0.010)

0.036**
(0.014)

0.010
(0.014)

-0.056***
(0.016)

Insurance Policy Parameters
ln(Stop Loss Limit)

-0.045***
(0.006)

-0.035***
(0.005)

-0.033***
(0.005)

-0.039***
(0.005)

-0.037***
(0.005)

Deductible

-0.019***
(0.003)

-0.077***
(0.003)

-0.076***
(0.003)

-0.076***
(0.003)

-0.072***
(0.003)

Coinsurance

-0.0004
(0.0004)

-0.0063***
(0.0004)

-0.0082***
(0.0004)

-0.0079***
(0.0004)

-0.0080***
(0.0004)

Age

0.011***
(0.001)

0.012***
(0.000)

0.013***
(0.000)

0.013***
(0.000)

0.013***
(0.000)

Smoker

0.052***
(0.014)

0.066***
(0.013)

0.092***
(0.012)

0.092***
(0.012)

0.090***
(0.013)

Student

-0.167***
(0.018)

-0.142***
(0.016)

-0.132***
(0.016)

-0.134***
(0.016)

-0.136***
(0.016)

Male

-0.107***
(0.008)

-0.115***
(0.008)

-0.114***
(0.007)

-0.116***
(0.007)

-0.114***
(0.008)

Medicare Wage Index (varies by MSA)

0.178***
(0.033)

0.146***
(0.033)

0.096***
(0.034)

State Premium Tax (rate)

-0.024***
(0.007)

-0.028***
(0.007)

-0.051***
(0.008)

ln(State Population)

0.001
(0.010)

-0.031***
(0.011)

-0.004
(0.012)

ln(State Per Capita Income)

0.769***
(0.139)

0.737***
(0.138)

0.348**
(0.150)

Age 65 and over (fraction of state)

-0.369
(0.309)

-0.133
(0.308)

-0.260
(0.329)

Black (fraction of state)

0.738***
(0.074)

0.974***
(0.076)

0.927***
(0.080)

Percent Urban in state

-0.206**
(0.080)

-0.243***
(0.080)

-0.439***
(0.093)

-1.654***
(0.317)

-1.186***
(0.318)

-0.532
(0.334)

1.656***
(0.268)

2.349***
(0.274)

2.751***
(0.307)

-2.159
(1.337)

-1.695
(1.329)

1.747
(1.434)

Additional Controls:

Employer-provided Insurance
(fraction of state)
Percent Noncitizen (fraction of state)
Constant

4.914***
(0.048)

4.794***
(0.046)

Observations
7,047
7,047
6,905
R-squared
0.12
0.29
0.33
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Regression were weighted by the number of policies represented in each observation.
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Table 6: Regressions Using Family Policies, Sales Data
Dependent Variable: Ln(Premium)

(1)

(2)

Column
(3)

(4)

(5)

Omit State with
Highest Number
of Mandates

Omit Top 3 and
Bottom 3 States
(Number of
Mandates)

Regulatory Variables:
Community Rating (indicator)

0.209***
(0.030)

0.284***
(0.039)

0.328***
(0.039)

0.331***
(0.039)

Guarantee Issue (indicator)

1.069***
(0.049)

0.836***
(0.071)

0.733***
(0.071)

0.896***
(0.075)

Mandated Benefits (count)

0.0092***
(0.0008)

-0.0014
(0.0013)

0.0024*
(0.0014)

0.0052***
(0.0017)

Any Willing Provider (indicator)

-0.025*
(0.013)

0.093***
(0.019)

0.075***
(0.019)

-0.014
(0.022)

Insurance Policy Parameters
ln(Stop Loss Limit)

-0.0710***
(0.0097)

-0.039***
(0.009)

-0.045***
(0.009)

-0.044***
(0.009)

-0.043***
(0.009)

Deductible

-0.016***
(0.004)

-0.079***
(0.004)

-0.073***
(0.004)

-0.073***
(0.004)

-0.080***
(0.004)

Coinsurance

0.001
(0.001)

-0.006***
(0.001)

-0.007***
(0.001)

-0.007***
(0.001)

-0.006***
(0.001)

Age

0.018***
(0.001)

0.019***
(0.001)

0.021***
(0.001)

0.020***
(0.001)

0.020***
(0.001)

Smoker

0.032
(0.021)

0.043**
(0.019)

0.075***
(0.018)

0.073***
(0.018)

0.078***
(0.019)

Student

-0.090**
(0.040)

-0.071**
(0.036)

-0.038
(0.035)

-0.033
(0.035)

-0.038
(0.036)

Male

0.003
(0.014)

0.004
(0.013)

0.024*
(0.013)

0.030**
(0.012)

0.031**
(0.013)

Average number of members per obs.

0.161***
(0.006)

0.158***
(0.005)

0.162***
(0.005)

0.160***
(0.005)

0.161***
(0.005)

Medicare Wage Index (varies by MSA)

0.237***
(0.052)

0.186***
(0.052)

0.138**
(0.054)

State Premium Tax (rate)

0.074***
(0.011)

0.078***
(0.011)

0.046***
(0.011)

ln(State Population)

-0.032**
(0.014)

-0.058***
(0.014)

-0.025
(0.015)

ln(State Per Capita Income)

0.466**
(0.190)

0.468**
(0.188)

0.107
(0.201)

Age 65 and over (fraction of state)

-0.791**
(0.385)

-0.464
(0.383)

-0.928**
(0.403)

Black (fraction of state)

0.533***
(0.105)

0.814***
(0.109)

0.742***
(0.110)

Percent Urban in state

0.214**
(0.107)

0.135
(0.107)

-0.023
(0.121)

Employer-provided Insurance

-0.848*
(0.450)

-0.271
(0.451)

0.226
(0.461)

Percent Noncitizen (fraction of state)

1.186***
(0.361)

1.980***
(0.370)

1.817***
(0.406)

4.814***
4.556***
0.364
(0.099)
(0.093)
(1.777)
Observations
4,462
4,462
4,390
R-squared
0.24
0.38
0.42
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Regression were weighted by the number of policies represented in each observation.

0.331
(1.760)
4,334
0.43

3.459*
(1.887)
4,132
0.43

Additional Controls:

Constant
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Table 7: Regressions Using Identical Family Policies, Offer Data
Column
Dependent Variable: Ln(Premium)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Omit State with
Highest Number
of Mandates

Omit Top 3 and
Bottom 3 States
(Number of
Mandates)

Regulatory Variables:
Mandated Benefits (count)

0.011***
(0.001)

0.0015
(0.0015)

0.0070***
(0.0018)

0.0101***
(0.0021)

Any Willing Provider (indicator)

0.097***
(0.013)

0.135***
(0.015)

0.119***
(0.015)

0.132***
(0.016)

Medicare Wage Index (varies by MSA)

0.520***
(0.078)

0.485***
(0.079)

0.536***
(0.081)

State Premium Tax (rate)

0.084***
(0.011)

0.069***
(0.011)

0.060***
(0.011)

ln(State Population)

0.117***
(0.014)

0.080***
(0.015)

0.065***
(0.016)

ln(State Per Capita Income)

2.181***
(0.203)

2.042***
(0.203)

2.066***
(0.206)

Age 65 and over (fraction of state)

0.804**
(0.335)

0.811**
(0.332)

0.614*
(0.342)

Black (fraction of state)

0.417***
(0.084)

0.505***
(0.084)

0.563***
(0.088)

Percent Urban in state

-0.161**
(0.077)

-0.192**
(0.077)

-0.038
(0.095)

-5.625***
(0.427)

-5.154***
(0.433)

-5.585***
(0.464)

-1.700***
(0.359)

-1.519***
(0.357)

-2.461***
(0.488)

-15.958***
(1.961)

-14.291***
(1.972)

-14.220***
(1.992)

Additional Controls:

Employer-provided Insurance
(fraction of state)

Percent Noncitizen (fraction of state)

Constant

5.332***
(0.022)

Observations
997
997
976
R-squared
0.21
0.49
0.50
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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